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G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 35/2: "PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS  
IN INDOCHINA

I. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

A. What is the current situation in Indochina with respect to the following:

1. The status of combat operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia?

The rainy season has greatly reduced combat activity in the Tonkin area. Both the Viet Minh and French Union forces have been resting and refitting during this period. In central and south Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Viet Minh have maintained sufficient pressure against French Union Forces to prevent the transfer of troops from those areas to Tonkin. Guerilla warfare continues throughout Indochina.

a. What trends have there been in the past six months in relative military strength, combat effectiveness and tactical disposition of French-Indochinese and Viet Minh forces?

(1) Strength - The relative strength of the French Associated States and Viet Minh forces has not changed substantially since 1 January 1952. It is estimated that the losses suffered by the Viet Minh during the Hoa Binh campaign and subsequent operations in the Red River Delta have been largely replaced. The expansion of the Associated States Armed Forces since 1 January 1952 has not appreciably affected the balance of military strength in Indochina.

(2) Combat Effectiveness - Since 1 January 1952, the French Associated States forces have made a slight gain over the Viet Minh in over-all combat effectiveness.

(a) Although the Viet Minh first-line units displayed a considerable increase in combat effectiveness during the Hoa Binh campaign, this increased effectiveness was not evident in subsequent operations by the second-line Viet Minh units (316th and 320th Divisions) within the Red River Delta. Morale reportedly is low in some Viet Minh units in Tonkin. The sick rate in many units is high, and the loss of many experienced cadre personnel through attrition has adversely affected the combat effectiveness of most Viet Minh units in Tonkin.

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In Cochinchina, a major decrease in Viet Minh capabilities was indicated when the Communists dissolved, at least temporarily, more than half of their regular units and utilized these in the training of depleted regional forces.

(b) The flow of Chinese Communist materiel to the Viet Minh has been more than offset by the continued arrival of large quantities of MDAP equipment. The mobility and effectiveness of French Union reserves in the Tonkin area have greatly increased as a result of receiving large numbers of motor vehicles during early 1952.

(c) In unit firepower and in materiel, the forces of the French Associated States are superior to the Viet Minh. The resultant reduction in relative combat effectiveness of Viet Minh forces in this area enabled the French-Vietnamese forces to make definite gains in pacifying certain regions of Cochinchina.

(3) Disposition - No major changes have occurred in the tactical dispositions of opposing forces in Indochina since the withdrawal of French forces from the Hoa Binh salient on 23 February. Of the nine Viet Minh regiments which had infiltrated into the French perimeter in Tonkin at the close of the Hoa Binh campaign, four still remained on 1 July.

b. What are present French-Indochinese capabilities to:

(1) Expand their area of control and inflict heavy losses on the Viet Minh, assuming the present nature and degree of Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh?

(a) Control - While the French Union forces have sufficient firepower and mobility to permit limited offensive operations against the Viet Minh, these forces are not now considered capable of gaining and maintaining control over significant areas of Viet Minh-held territory

1. The continued arrival of French replacements and the continued strengthening of French Union forces should permit further reduction of Viet Minh activity within the delta by about October.

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2. By the latter part of 1952, the French Union forces should have the capability of expanding slightly their area of control in Cochinchina, but the areas of control in Annam, Cambodia, or Laos are likely to remain substantially unchanged.

3. In general, the expansion of areas of control, on other than a temporary basis, is not in itself a profitable objective for the French so long as the Viet Minh forces continue to avoid engaging in close and decisive combat, and so long as the French and Vietnamese are incapable of consolidating effectively and defending their gains.

(b) Losses - The French Union advantage in mobility and firepower (an advantage which probably will be increased by the arrival of additional MDAP equipment during the next 12 months) gives them the capability of inflicting heavy losses on the Viet Minh when the Viet Minh can be engaged in close combat. However, the employment of "hit and run" and/or guerrilla tactics by the Viet Minh does not now permit the French Union forces to effectively exploit their capability.

(2) Hold presently occupied territory in Indochina against the Viet Minh operating with the present nature and degree of Chinese Communist assistance?

French Union forces in Cambodia, Laos, South and Central Vietnam should be able to hold their presently held territories through mid-1953. In Tonkin the French should be able to hold the Red River Delta. Although it is expected that the Viet Minh will re-infiltrate the Red River Delta in some force during 1952, it is estimated that French Union forces will control this area more firmly by the end of 1953 than at present.

(3) Resist attacks by the Viet Minh operating with substantially increased Chinese Communist assistance?

(a) It is estimated that the French Union forces could hold the areas that they presently control in Cambodia, Laos and Cochinchina, at least through mid-1953. In Central Vietnam, the French could resist Viet Minh attacks and hold the Quang Tri-Hue-Tourana area, although they might be forced to reduce the area held and evacuate their

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(b) Barring the introduction of Chinese

Communist troops into Indochina, the French Union forces probably could hold the strategic areas of the Red River Delta.

(4) Resist attacks by combined Viet Minh-Chinese Communist combat forces?

The capability of the French Union to resist attacks by combined Viet Minh-Chinese Communist forces is dependent upon the number of Chinese Communist troops employed and the effectiveness of their commitment and the amount of air support provided. The commitment of 150,000 Chinese Communist troops in Indochina--the maximum force which they are logistically capable of supporting--and particularly if this force were supported by air, would probably result in a French evacuation of Tonkin before outside assistance could be brought to bear. Such an evacuation would be extremely difficult. In this circumstance, the French probably would be forced to initiate a general withdrawal from Indochina unless Western counteraction promised some hope of restoring the position of the French Union in Indochina.

2. No contribution.

3. No contribution.

4. The situation in Viet Minh-held territory, including morale, food supply, armament production, relations with Chinese Communists, manpower resources, and extent and effectiveness of controls?

(a) General - The Viet Minh continue in firm control of the land, peoples, resources and production in most of the areas that they occupy. There have been reports of unrest in some Viet Minh areas, including a revolt of several hundred Catholics in northern Annam during the first part of 1952. However, these activities are scattered and the Viet Minh generally exercise effective control over their areas.

(b) Morale - Viet Minh morale among the rank and file of the military forces is believed to be only fair. High casualties and the absence of a major victory during 1951 and 1952 have caused a drop in their morale. Morale among Viet Minh higher echelons, both military and political,

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is believed good. The general population in many cases is apathetic toward the Viet Minh war effort due to continued poor living conditions.

(c) Food Supply - The Viet Minh cannot produce sufficient quantities of food in their own territory to meet both military and civilian needs. They have been forced into importing food from Communist China and infiltrating large numbers of troops into the Red River Delta for the primary purpose of collecting rice. It is estimated that rice raids and imports will satisfy Viet Minh minimum requirements.

(d) Armament Production - The Viet Minh produce some armament such as grenades, small arms, mortars, bazookas and ammunition. However, the industry is primitive and there are no major production facilities in Viet Minh-held territory. The former railway shops at Vinh are probably the largest facilities available for military production.

(e) Relations with Chinese Communists - The Viet Minh and Chinese Communists continue to maintain close and apparently friendly relations. As many as 10,000 Chinese Communist advisers and technicians continue to assist the Viet Minh, principally in the Tonkin area. Limited numbers of Viet Minh troops continue to be trained in Chinese Communist territory. In northwestern Tonkin, Chinese Communist units reportedly have actually crossed the border to aid the Viet Minh in operations against French-supported native guerrillas. However, Chinese Communist troops have not been identified in forward areas.

(f) Manpower - A recent French study indicated that only 46% of the 24,400,000 people of Vietnam are under the effective control of the Vietnam Government. However, the Viet Minh have difficulty in exploiting the manpower potential in areas under their control since the heavier populated areas are located within the Red River Delta and in areas in Cochinchina which are surrounded by French Union troops. It is estimated, however, that during the present rainy season the Viet Minh will be able to reconstitute their regular units.

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3. What is the current nature and level of Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh?

1. During the last quarter of 1951, it was expected that about 4,000 tons of supplies would be furnished to the Viet Minh by the Chinese Communists. It is now estimated that less than 2,000 tons were actually delivered during that period. During the first quarter of 1952, the amount of aid decreased. This reduction was probably due to the interdiction of the northern Tonkin routes by the French, by a shortage of gasoline to operate the some 300 Viet Minh trucks which transport supplies from the Indochina-China border to Viet Minh depots and troops, by transport difficulties within Communist China, and possibly by the ready availability of supplies in Communist China.

2. It is believed that Chinese Communist materiel aid to the Viet Minh has increased since May 1952 but has not reached the level attained during the last quarter of 1951. The amount of this aid, however, is probably less than that provided during the last quarter of 1951 (less than 700 tons a month).

3. Military supplies and equipment furnished the Viet Minh by the Chinese Communists include gasoline, gun oil, explosives, weapons (mostly small arms, mortars and machine guns, plus a few heavier antiaircraft and artillery weapons), medical equipment, quartermaster supplies (including food and clothing), signal equipment, and vehicles and vehicular equipment. Most of the supplies consist of armament and ammunition; however, the amount of the various supplies and equipment supplied by the Chinese Communists is unknown.

4. National Bank of Viet Minh are printed in Communist China.

5. Small shipments of textile equipment and other equipment for a motor repair ship have been reported.

6. The selling of diversified goods such as moving picture equipment, charcoal for wood-burning vehicles, plaster, cloth, paper and sewing machines to a Viet Minh purchasing commission in Nanning has been reported.

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C. What is the current nature and level of French support to the Associated States of Indochina?

1. Military

a. French support for the Associated States armies, currently falls within two general categories: the employment of French Union troops under French command against the Viet Minh, and the activation and training of Associated States armed forces.

b. In the expansion of the Associated States armies, the French have transferred Indochinese units from the French regular army to the Associated States armies, furnished cadres for new Associated States units (See paragraph II, A,2,a(2), page 13), and have supplied some non-combat equipment such as clothing and boots to the Associated States armies.

(1) As of April 1952, French cadres provided for the Associated States armies were as follows:

	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Laos</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	641	64	69	774
NCO's	3,653	257	224	4,134
GM	198	--	--	198
Total	4,492	321	293	5,106

(2) Through 1953, the armies of the Associated States will be entirely dependent on the French for air and armored (other than reconnaissance) support and largely dependent on the French for artillery support, especially in heavy artillery (See paragraph II, A,2,a, page 13).

2. No contribution.

3. No contribution.

D. What is the current nature and level of U.S. support to the French and Indochina?

1. Military

a. The United States provides the following types of army aid for Indochina:

(1) The replacement of obsolete and worn-out equipment in the hands of French Union forces;

(2) The initial equipping of newly organized Associated States units; and

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(3) A large share of the continuing logistical requirements of the French in the form of ammunition, spare parts, and the replacement of combat losses.

b. A United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is maintained in Saigon to supervise the distribution of U.S. materiel delivered in Indochina.

c. Existing United States programs provide approximately 30 percent of the total financial burden of the Indochinese war. As of 30 April 1952, a total of about \$347,000,000 has been expended by the United States for aid to Indochina. As of this date, equipment shipped to Indochina totalled 94,800 tons, including 6,000 tons delivered in April 1952. Among the items shipped are 657 combat vehicles, 5,565 trucks, 1,728 trailers, 78,713 small arms and automatic weapons (including 1,464 rocket launchers), 1,400 mortars and artillery pieces, 18,000,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, 260,000 mines and rockets, and 3,869 radio sets.

2. No contribution.

3. No contribution.

## II. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

### A. French-Indochinese Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action

1. How will French and Indochinese will and intention to resist be affected by the following:

a. Political, economic, and military developments in Western Europe, and within metropolitan France, and the French Union?

(1) In the long term, political, economic, and military developments in Western Europe, France, and French North Africa probably will be the determining factors in French will and intention to resist in Indochina. At present and for the foreseeable future, France will be unable, simultaneously, to proceed with domestic recovery, to meet French NATO commitments, to stabilize the North African situation, and to terminate successfully the war in Indochina.

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(2) The French apparently have given the following priority to the above commitments:

- (a) Domestic recovery
- (b) NATO
- (c) French North Africa
- (d) Indochina

(3) The French effort in Indochina is one of necessity, not one of choice. Further, France probably would like to withdraw from Indochina as soon as practicable if she could avoid

1. Abandonment of her extensive economic interests there;

2. Leaving the country at the mercy of the Viet Minh and Chinese Communists, and

3. Jeopardizing the entire Western position in Southeast Asia.

b. Political and economic trends within Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, including attitudes towards French imperial control and toward the Chinese Communists? (To what extent are the Chinese Communists regarded as conquerors and to what extent as liberators from white controls?)

(1) The French will and intent to resist in Indochina are not likely to be greatly influenced by political or economic trends within Indochina.

(2) The assumption of Premiership by the King of Cambodia, and the replacement in Vietnam of Tran Van Huu by by Nguyen Van Tam will probably result in closer cooperation between the French and the government officials of those two States. However, such cooperation will not be popular with the general populace of any of the three Associated States. Indochinese memories of French colonial rule, and the desire to achieve complete independence will continue to be a constant and unavoidable source of difficulty in

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the fight against Communism. However, this difficulty is lessened to some extent by the general Indochinese antipathy for the Chinese, and by the unwillingness on the part of politically conscious Indochinese to allow the newly granted national independence to be overcome by Communism, especially Chinese Communism.

(3) Although dissidence constitutes a potential internal danger, it is unlikely to constitute a serious threat to the French Union.

c. Possible tripartite warnings to the Chinese Communists to keep their troops out of Indochina?

Such public warnings would considerably improve the morale and peace of mind of both the French and Indochinese, particularly if it committed the United States and the United Kingdom to the defense of Indochina in the event of direct Chinese Communist intervention.

d. Changes in the level of United States economic and military assistance and in the nature of the United States commitment for the defense of Indochina?

A reduction in the level of United States economic and military assistance would adversely affect both Indochinese and French will to resist the Communists in Indochina. Greater United States commitments are likely to increase the will of the French and Indochinese and the capability of the Indochinese to resist.

e. A cease-fire in Korea?

(1) A cease-fire in Korea probably would cause the French to demand a Western guarantee of assistance in the event of Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina.

(2) Such a guarantee, together with a tripartite warning, probably would offset a French tendency toward withdrawal from Indochina in the face of the increased threat of possible Chinese Communist invasion of Indochina that would follow a cease-fire in Korea.

(3) The French probably hope for a settlement of the Indochinese problem in the event of a cease-fire in Korea.

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1. An expansion of the Korean war?

The French probably view with alarm any possibility that the Korean war might be extended onto the China mainland as inviting Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, and voiding any hopes for an over-all political settlement in the Far East. This eventuality, without strong additional Western support, probably would adversely affect the French will to resist in Indochina unless substantial Western assistance were assured.

2. Political, military, and economic developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia?

French will to resist in Indochina would be adversely affected by Chinese Communist aggression or by increased Chinese Communist pressures against or within other South and Southeast Asian countries, unless the prospects were good for large-scale Western assistance to these countries as well as to Indochina. Continued Burmese and Filipino successes against indigenous Communist groups should be mildly encouraging to the French and Associated States as examples of the successful development of native forces to combat internal Communist groups.

3. What trends in French-Indochinese capabilities to resist or reduce Viet Minh-Chinese Communist pressure are probable?

The French and Associated States probably will improve slightly their capabilities to resist Communist pressure during 1952 and 1953. The assimilation of United States MDAP aid, the development of better native military leaders, and the increased combat effectiveness of the growing native forces are likely to result in slow improvements. On the other hand, it is likely that the French may attempt to reduce the size of their forces in Indochina as the armies of the Associated States increase in number. Should this occur, it could adversely affect the eventual French Union capability to resist the Viet Minh.

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The most hopeful French objective now is to contain the Viet Minh in the more unfavorable areas of Indochina and await the time when a solution to all Far Eastern problems is possible.

a. In trained manpower, organized forces, and material supply (including United States aid)

(1) French-Vietnamese Forces

(a) Although further development of the armed forces of the Associated States is planned through 1954, this expansion probably will not result in a significant increase in either the number of armed personnel or in the number of organized units. Of the 14 battalions to be added to the Vietnam Army during the remainder of 1952, 12 will be transferred from existing native units of the French colonial forces. The non-indigenous strength of the French Union Forces may remain constant through 1952, but some minor reduction, either through return of units to France and North Africa or a reduction in the rate of flow of replacements, may occur after 1952. Even though no reduction in the size of the non-indigenous forces is made, the total number of troops in the French regular additional forces will probably continue to decrease through 1953 and 1954 as transfers of native units from the French to the Associated States forces are made.

(b) So long as French cadres and/or advisors remain with the expanding Associated States forces, no decrease in their combat effectiveness is foreseen; however, as experienced French personnel are replaced by young and relatively inexperienced native cadres, some decrease in the efficiency, morale, and reliability of the units must be expected. The lack of qualified native commanders and staff personnel, particularly in units above battalion level, the shortage of junior officers, will not permit the Governments of the Associated States to assume full responsibility for military operations prior to 1955.

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(c) Plans for the expansion of the Associated States' armies through 1954 do not provide for a force of sufficient strength, in combination with the French, to insure the military defeat of the Viet Minh. The most optimistic view is that they will be capable of forcing the Viet Minh regulars into mountainous, thinly populated areas and of reducing to some extent, but not completely, Viet Minh guerrilla activity. The combined French Associated States Forces, as presently planned through 1954, probably will not be capable of resisting successfully a large scale combined Viet Minh-Chinese Communist offensive.

(d) Any significant redeployment of French forces to Europe prior to 1955 would correspondingly decrease French and Associated States capabilities to resist the Communist Forces in Indochina.

(e) Any reduction in current levels of United States aid to Indochina, except for that resulting from completion of initial equipping of French-Associated States forces, will likewise decrease the capabilities of the French and the Associated States.

(2) Laotian and Cambodian Forces

(a) Only small increases are planned for the Laotian and Cambodian forces through 1954.

(b) In Cambodia, the effort for the remainder of 1952 will be devoted to bringing presently organized units to full strength. In 1953 and 1954, plans provide for the activation of only two additional infantry battalions and some small service and supporting units. By 31 December 1954, the Royal Cambodian Forces are scheduled to total 16,300 men, including eight infantry battalions, one armored battalion, plus small support and service units. All arms and combat equipment will be provided through United States MDAP aid.

(c) During 1952, two infantry battalions (one of these is to be transferred from existing French Colonial units) and small support and service elements are planned for the Laotian army.

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B. Viet Minh-Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

1. What trends in Viet Minh-Chinese Communist capabilities are probable through mid-1955 assuming a continuation of the present situation in Korea?

a. In terms of trained Viet Minh manpower?

All physically-fit men of military age available to the Viet Minh who have received military training are believed to be serving in Viet Minh forces at the present time. If Viet Minh losses during the operational season 1952-53 are comparable to those suffered in the past season, it is believed that the Viet Minh will be capable of little more than replacing their losses. The replacement of qualified non-commissioned and commissioned officers probably will be difficult.

b. In terms of Viet Minh ability to utilize effectively heavy military equipment and to coordinate in combat all of their organized forces?

(1) As a result of the experience gained during the Hoa Binh campaign, the Viet Minh may be expected to improve their ability to utilize medium mortars (120-160-mm) and light artillery pieces (75-mm). Although they are known to possess heavier artillery pieces (105-mm), these larger weapons have seldom been employed. Training and ammunition supply, French air activity, poor roads and the lack of vehicle maintenance and repair facilities in Viet Minh forward areas, limit the large-scale use of heavy weapons, vehicles and other heavy equipment.

c. In terms of Chinese Communist abilities to provide an increased volume of technical and material assistance?

(1) The amount of material assistance which the Chinese Communists can provide for the Viet Minh probably is limited more by the availability of arms and equipment and by the capacity of the Viet Minh to absorb it, than by the lines of communication in South China.

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(2) The Chinese Communist ability to produce military items of equipment for the Viet Minh is expected to increase materially as the several new arsenals near the Indochina border begin production. Although the present problems of delivery are likely to remain, the Chinese Communists are capable of increasing the level of their logistic support for Viet Minh military activity during the 1952-53 operational season.

(3) The fact that the number of skilled technicians in Communist China is limited probably will serve to prevent the Chinese Communists from materially increasing their technical advisory assistance to the Viet Minh during the period of this estimate.

1. In terms of Chinese Communist abilities to commit combat forces in Indochina?

It is estimated that the Chinese Communist capability to commit and support logistically some 150,000 ground troops, with air support, in Indochina probably will remain substantially unchanged through mid-1953.

2. What effect would a cease-fire in Korea or an expansion of the war in Korea have on Communist capabilities in Indochina?

a. Cease-fire in Korea - A cease-fire in Korea would increase the already significant Chinese Communist capabilities to invade Indochina. Increased quantities of supplies and equipment, as well as increased ground and air strengths, would become available to the Chinese Communists.

b. An expansion of the Korean war by the UN probably would decrease present Chinese Communist capabilities for direct intervention in Indochina, and increase their dependence on the U.S.S.R. for assistance, in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the UN operations, particularly in Manchuria and China proper.

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3. How will Viet Minh courses of action be affected by the following?

a. Failure to receive an increased level of material and technical assistance?

The Viet Minh probably would be limited to the following courses of action:

- (1) Periodic and limited objective divisional attacks against the Tonkin perimeter.
- (2) Infiltration of the Tonkin Delta for the purpose of conducting guerrilla and other harassing operations.
- (3) Continue to conduct guerrilla activity in Cambodia, Laos, South and Central Vietnam, including occasional relatively strong attacks against targets of opportunity.

b. No contribution.

c. Deterioration in their combat effectiveness?

A serious decline in Viet Minh combat effectiveness would force the Viet Minh to reduce the scale and effectiveness of their military operations. A continued decline would ultimately force the Viet Minh to confine their operations to guerrilla activity.

d. An increase in their combat effectiveness?

An appreciable increase in the effectiveness of Viet Minh units would enable the Viet Minh to launch simultaneous attacks of about divisional strength against French positions in Tonkin and in central Vietnam. However, during the period of this estimate, it is considered unlikely that the combat effectiveness of Viet Minh units in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will increase substantially.

e. Political, economic, and military developments elsewhere in southeast Asia?

Internal Communist success in other Southeast Asian countries undoubtedly would improve Viet Minh morale and increase their will to fight.

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Should the Chinese Communists invade Burma and/or Thailand and provide additional military assistance to the Viet Minh, the Viet Minh undoubtedly would increase the intensity of their operations against the French and Associated States forces in order to further weaken the position of the French in Indochina.

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4. How will Chinese Communist courses of action in Indochinabe influenced by the following?a. Overall Communist interests and policy in the Far East?

(1) It is generally accepted that the ultimate Communist objective with respect to Southeast Asia is the elimination of Western influence and the subordination of the area to Communist domination. Communist control of Indochina would represent a major gain toward the achievement of that objective.

(2) The geographical location of Communist China with respect to Indochina permits the Communists to pursue a patient policy of attrition in conducting operations against the French in Indochina, which, together with French burdens in Western Europe and North Africa, could possibly force the French to voluntarily abandon Indochina.

(3) In the absence of a Soviet decision to initiate global war, the Communists probably estimate that they can eventually gain their objective in Indochina with less risk of becoming involved in a general war with the Western nations by means short of direct intervention.

b. A change in French-Indochinese capabilities?

A marked decrease in French Union capabilities might result in the provision of increased Chinese Communist logistic assistance in order to enable the Viet Minh to exploit the situation. On the other hand, an increase in French Union capabilities to the extent of threatening the existence of the Viet Minh might bring about direct Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina.

c. A change in the strength and effectiveness of the Viet Minh?

See b. above.

d. A tripartite warning to keep their troops out of Indochina?

A tripartite warning to Communist China, with the implied threat of retaliatory action against the Chinese mainland, probably would serve as a deterrent to direct Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, unless the Communists had already decided to deliberately expand

the war in the Far East.

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- (1) Under present conditions, the uncertainty of

future commitments in Korea might cause the Chinese Communists to defer a decision with respect to invading Indochina.

(2) In the event of a cease-fire in Korea, the Communists probably would assess the risks of direct intervention in Indochina and the advantages to be gained by a quick military victory and would also assess the likelihood of achieving their objectives through the continuation of attritional tactics. The determination displayed by the West to defend Indochina could well be the determining factor against direct intervention.

(3) In the event that the UN extended the Korean war to the mainland of China, the Communists might decide to intervene in Indochina before effective Western assistance could be rendered to the French, under the assumption that global war was imminent.

f. Other contingencies such as the release of Nationalist internees in Indochina, combat operations by Chinese Nationalist troops in Southeast Asia, or against the China mainland, etc.?

(1) It is improbable that the French release of the approximately 30,000 Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina to the Formosan government would materially affect Chinese Communist courses of action in Indochina. Similarly, the continued operation of remnant Chinese Nationalists in Burma against Yunnan probably would not materially affect Communist courses of action in Indochina. However the existence of this Chinese Nationalist force might be exploited as one of several excuses for initiating offensive action in Indochina or Burma in the event of a Communist decision to undertake such operations.

(2) The employment of large numbers of Chinese Nationalist troops in Indochina probably would be of serious concern to the Chinese Communists; however, unless the Viet Minh position were seriously threatened, it is unlikely that such employment alone would precipitate Chinese Communist intervention.

5. No contribution.

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